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his Policy Notes provides an update of
housing subsidies in the Philippines and the
fiscal costs of their application. It addresses the
issue on whether the subsidies for housing
programs could have been put into more
efficient use by the government.
Housing subsidies in retrospect
The Philippine socialized housing program
consists of a combination of explicit and
implicit subsidies intended to improve the
affordability levels of low-income families.
Explicit subsidies involve documented transfers
that are on budget. In particular, these are: (1)
upfront grants to reduce the cost of housing or
serviced lots under the resettlement program;
and (2) government direct funding for the
housing loan program for low-income
households. On the other hand, implicit
subsidies involve transfers at a price lower than
the market rate. These subsidies include: (1) low
interest mortgages; (2) exemptions from taxes
or levies; and (3) underpriced and tax-exempt
guarantees or risk insurance. Implicit subsidies
are off budget but for government, they
represent both forgone income and contingent
liabilities associated with potential default and
stock losses.
A study of housing-related subsidies in the
Philippines estimates that a total of PHP 25.4
billion in explicit and implicit subsidies was
provided to the housing sector over the period
1993–95.1 About 90 percent (PHP 23 billion) of
these subsidies consist of interest subsidies
channeled through home mortgage programs
and developmental loan programs. The other
______________
1 G. Llanto and A. Orbeta 2001.PN 2011-14
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subsidies are cash transfers and forgone income
from tax exemptions. In addition, and even more
of a concern than interest subsidy flows, there
are the fiscal costs associated with potential
stock losses. During the period 1993–1995,
government-subsidized housing finance
programs were mainly administered by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation or
NHMFC. The NHMFC managed four major low-
income housing finance programs, namely, (1)
the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP), a
financing program funded by pooled funds from
NHMFC, Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF), Social Security System (SSS), and
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
that offers subsidized credit to borrowers of
lowest loan packages (PHP 150,000 to PHP
375,000); (2) the Community Mortgage Program
(CMP), a government-funded loan program that
provides subsidized loans to community
associations in blighted areas; (3) the Abot Kaya
Pabahay Funds, a loan program funded by
government to finance the development of low-
cost housing and provide outright amortization
support to poor households in the first five
years of loan amortization; and (4) the Social
Housing Development Loan Program (SHDLP), a
housing program funded by internally generated
funds of NHMFC that aims to complement the
UHLP through financial assistance to private
developers, nongovernment organizations
(NGOs), landowners, and local government units
(LGUs) in undertaking social housing projects.
In 1996, the NHMFC was considered “technically
insolvent and irreversibly illiquid.”2 The
Corporation incurred net losses of PHP 64.07
million in 1993, which increased six-fold by end
of 1995 to PHP 340 million. The fiscal impact of
these losses is huge. Rough estimate of the
amount of funding needed to bring NHMFC up to
liquidity and capital adequacy standards and to
provide for interest shortfalls for the UHLP and
SHDLP is about PHP 23 billion (or slightly over
1% of GNP in March 1996) under fairly
conservative scenarios.3
On the other hand, these costs did not
significantly impact on the poor and low-income
sector. Llanto and Orbeta (2001) showed that
the actual incidence of subsidies is highly
regressive. For instance, the bulk of subsidies
are low-interest mortgages channeled through
the UHLP scheme, which, by its design, primarily
serviced borrowers in the middle- and high-
income deciles. The World Bank study also
reported that a large proportion of the resources
used in making homeownership available had
been wasted. This is because the interest
subsidy, which was provided to largely middle-
income clients, spans over 25 years whereas the
real burden of amortization declines over time
with inflation and increase in homebuyer’s
income over the life span of the loan. Had a
shorter period for interest subsidy been
provided, government could have deployed
resources elsewhere or reached a larger set of
beneficiaries. Moreover, the scheme of providing
guaranteed take-outs to developers has led to
______________
2 See Bueno and Sugitan 1997. The Report builds on
previous examinations done by the Landbank’s Management
and Operations review of the NHMFC (May 1995), the BSP
Examination of the NHMFC (July 1995), and the 1995 COA
Audit Report.
3 Bueno and Sugitan 1997. The estimate includes cost of
collection, write-off for loan loss provision, government
guarantee on interest shortfall on loans to funders (HDMF,
SSS, GSIS), and assumption of additional capital needed




distorted incentives. With the developer’s
objective for rapid turnover of capital, there is
less incentive to find creditworthy buyers or to
meet satisfactory development standards. In
some cases, said scheme had even opened the
system to fraud and anomalous transactions.
Current structure of housing
subsidies
Despite the allocative and distributive
inefficiencies of the design of socialized housing
programs as noted above, the forms of housing
subsidies have not changed at all. Government,
however, has reorganized the process of program
implementation to reduce losses. The
institutional and policy changes in the last ten
years or so are as follows:
z HDMF has taken over the primary role of
providing housing loans to low- and middle-
income families, with about 64 percent of home
lending being provided by HDMF (Figure 1).
HDMF continues to implement below market
rates for socialized and low-cost housing. The
value of socialized housing or loan packages had
been increased from PHP 150,000 to PHP
400,000 while that of low-cost housing, from
above PHP 150,000 to PHP 375,000 to above
PHP 400,000 to PHP 2.5 million. The loan term
has also been extended from 25 to 30 years at a
fixed interest rate of 6 percent  for socialized
housing and 7 to 11.5 percent for low-cost
housing. Except for loan packages below PHP
1.0 million, interest rates are being repriced
every two years.4 The distribution across loan
packages and repricing for higher loan packages
allow the HDMF to operate a cross-subsidization
scheme where borrowers of the higher loan
packages would subsidize borrowers of the
lowest loan packages.
______________
4 Interest rates are adjusted to, at most, 2 percent every
two years based on prevailing market rates.
5 SHFC was created through issuance of Executive Order 272
(January 2004).
6 The NPL sale was through a joint venture agreement
between the buyer DB Global Opportunities Group (DBGO)
and the NHMFC. The Special Purpose Corporation named
Balikatan Housing Finance, Inc. (BHFI) is 51 percent owned
by DBGO, 44 percent by NHMFC and 5 percent owned by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC).
z NHMFC has moved out of the primary
housing finance market; instead, its subsidiary
corporation, the Social Housing Finance
Corporation (SHFC), took over in developing and
administering social housing programs,
particularly the CMP and the Abot-Kaya Pabahay
Fund (AKPF) Program, specifically the
amortization support and development financing
programs.5 Both UHLP and SHDLP were abolished
and NHMFC disposed of its highly delinquent
and nonperforming accounts with a principal
value of PHP 12.8 billion. The nonperforming
loans (NPLs) were transferred to a special
purpose corporation, the Balikatan Housing
Finance, Inc., which is 56 percent privately
owned.6 The AKPF for development financing is
Figure 1. Releases for the primary mortgage/contract
receivables market (2001–2009)
Sources: BSP, HDMF/GSIS/SSS Annual ReportsPN 2011-14
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also under restructuring due to high default
rates. NHMFC’s current operation is focused on
the collection of past due accounts from its
various programs since it has to meet loan
obligations with its funders, the SSS, GSIS, and
HDMF. The Corporation is also strengthening its
primary mandate of establishing a secondary
mortgage market (SMM) for the development of
securitization in the country. Its SMM operation
was launched in 2009 and is still at an infancy
stage.
z The Home Guarantee Corporation (HGC) has
been strengthened through increased
capitalization under the HGC Act of 2000. The
New HGC Charter approved a capitalization of
PHP 12 billion, providing the agency a guaranty
capacity of about PHP 130 billion or 20 times
its equity. More than 60 percent of HGC
outstanding regular guarantees are socialized
housing packages (i.e., loan packages of PHP
400,000 and below) and low-income housing
(i.e., loan packages above PHP 400,000 to PHP
3.0 million). However, the share of this sector
has declined over time, specifically socialized
housing which represented only 6 percent of
total guarantee in 2010, way below the 40
percent allocation required under the HGC
Charter.7 Most socialized housing packages are
covered under the Abot Kaya Cash Flow
guarantee, a special guarantee fund
administered by the HGC for socialized housing
loans originated by HDMF, SSS, GSIS, and their
accredited institutions.8
z To date, HGC has not adopted risk-based
premiums. Clients continue to pay guarantee
premiums of 1.5 to 2.5 percent which is much
lower than the tax breaks of 9.5 to 11 percent
on income tax of guaranteed loans.9 HGC has
been operating at loss as it continues to service
claims from guaranteed accounts resulting from
high default rates of 17 to 20 percent which was
incurred by the Corporation from 1999 to 2001.
Most of the defaulting accounts are development
loans, specifically big ticket projects such as the
Smokey Mountain and Pabahay sa Riles. Finance
charges alone from the HGC borrowings to
service claims amount to an annual average of
PHP 1.1 billion for the period 2006–2009.
Comparatively, retail guaranty accounts from
banks and developers showed good performance.
Guarantee claims for retail accounts have been
reduced to only 0.05 percent in 2007 to almost
nil (0.003%) in 2010. Apparently, most lenders
do not claim on guaranty but enroll their
accounts anyway for the tax incentive. Due to
HGC’s attempt to improve its financial position,
the Corporation has focused its operation on
retail guaranty and increased the share of
nonsocialized loan packages in its guarantee
portfolio. These actions alone, however, are not
sufficient to cover for approximately PHP 28
billion of guarantee claims from past accounts.10
z The National Housing Authority (NHA)
continues to manage public production of
______________
7 One explanation from the HGC is that borrowers are taking
up higher loan packages. The combined pressure of high
land prices, high land development costs, and construction
costs has in reality moved the socialized housing ceiling to
PHP 750,000.
8 There is no premium fee charged on enrollments under the
Abot Kaya program; however, guarantee capacity is only
one times the equity of PHP 2.5 billion. HDMF, SSS, GSIS
can also enroll in the regular guarantee program.
9 Guarantee fee varies from 1.5 to 2.5 percent depending on
the type of guarantee coverage and type of loan packages.
Retail guaranty is charged lower fees than developmental
guaranty. Socialized housing packages have lower
guarantee fees than open market housing.
10 HGC floated zero coupon bonds to service 16 billion of
guarantee claims from bad accounts. It intends to sell




housing primarily for the resettlement of
residents affected by national government
infrastructure projects and those households
occupying danger areas. NHA also provides
resettlement assistance to LGUs usually under a
joint venture arrangement. Aside from
resettlement projects, NHA also undertakes other
programs (i.e., sites and services, medium rise,
local housing) using funds provided under the
Comprehensive Shelter Finance Act (CISFA) as
capital. While the private sector is producing
socialized housing with prices ranging from PHP
400,000 to PHP 750,000 per unit, NHA housing
packages cost PHP 160,000 to PHP 300,000 per
unit. The lower cost housing packages translate
into subsidy in the form of budgetary
appropriations, free or low-cost government
lands, and corporate fiscal incentives.
z The Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC) has been tasked
to harmonize the release of public lands for
socialized housing use. In an effort to provide
access to lands and tenure security to low-
income families, government proclaims certain
public lands for private ownership by virtue of
presidential proclamations and other legal
instruments. These lands are either turned over
to NHA or LGUs to be developed into housing
subdivisions and for disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. In particular, this program has
regularized informal settler families occupying
public lands as well as provided lands for other
marginalized sectors.
Fiscal costs of socialized housing
Table 1 gives an account of the major subsidies
provided as per the institutional and policy
changes cited earlier. The bulk of annual
subsidies for housing still consists of interest
subsidy provided mainly through HDMF home
mortgages. This amount is comparatively lower
than that of the UHLP due to the lower market
interest rate in the current period.11 In the
1990s, mortgage rate was a high of 23 percent
which implied an interest rate difference of 14
percent between the market and the mandated
interest rate for socialized housing. The current
market interest rate, on the average, is 11.5
percent, a difference of at most 5.5 percent from
the mandated rate.
Aside from lower market rates, there is also
evidence of limited exposure to the socialized
sector. In 1995 alone, the total loan portfolio
from UHLP for socialized housing (up to PHP
375,000) amounted to PHP 57.7 billion. In
2009, the socialized loan portfolio (< PHP
400,000) amounts to about PHP 7.0 billion
while low-income housing portfolio (> PHP
400,000 to PHP 2.5 M) amounted to PHP 38
billion. The increase in ceilings of housing
packages does not benefit the poor and those in
the low-income deciles at all, primarily because
the ratio of housing price to income has also
increased. This implies that the higher prices
further crowd out the low-income borrowers and
______________
11 In 1995, the annual interest subsidy was in the range of
PHP 3.0 to PHP 5.4 billion. See Benjamin and Dubel 1997.
In an effort to provide access to lands and tenure security
to low-income families, government proclaims certain
public lands for private ownership by virtue of
presidential proclamations and other legal instruments.
These lands are either turned over to NHA or LGUs to be




the interest subsidy is captured primarily by the
middle- and high-income sectors.
On the other hand, requiring the financial system
to take out or guarantee subprime loans implies
that government assumes 100 percent of the risk
and the resulting nonperforming loans translate
to impaired assets and losses from sale of these
assets. The costs arising from the associated
defaults of these loans amounted to over PHP
1.0 billion in 2009 alone. The true fiscal cost of
the risks assumed by the government is a cause
for concern since this adds up to the contingent
liabilities of the government.
The bulk of direct subsidy or cash transfers are
channeled to the NHA for the production of low-
cost housing. Although NHA housing programs
are targeted for low-income households,
resettlement in areas far from places of work and
town centers can be costly to government since
this would also require government to provide
basic facilities such as schools and livelihood
programs for the displaced families. Several
studies also point to the ineffectiveness of the
program since many beneficiaries return back to
urban centers. Moreover, international evidence
suggests that public housing provision crowds
out private developers. A study conducted in the
US found that each new additional unit of
publicly subsidized housing was associated with
a decrease in private housing production of
about 0.85 units.12 While no similar study has
been done in the Philippines, the crowding-out
effect may likely be a problem given that NHA
enjoys government equity injections, access to
free land, and corporate fiscal incentives.
Table 1. Cost of housing subsidies in 2009
Housing Subsidy Value (PHP million)
Home Development Mutual Fund
Interest subsidy  1,837.79
Socialized (up to PHP 400,000) 389.84
Low cost (> PHP 400,000 to PHP 2.5M)a 1,447.95
Social Security System/
Government Service Insurance System
Interest subsidyb 10.41
Community Mortgage Program 162.02
Interest subsidy 33.42
Loan lossesc 1.29
National Housing Authority Resettlement 3,409.97
Resettlement subsidyd 1,073.18
Budget appropriationse 2,126.82
Home Guarantee Corporation 1,442.14
Tax exemption (retail)f 277.37
Tax exemption (developmental)f 0.98
Lossesg 1,163.78
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council Tenure Security Programh 30.73
Subdivision cost of proclaimed Lands 12.98
Budget appropriation (urban asset reform) 17.75
Grand total 6,765.74
% to GDP (2009) 0.088
Summary by type PHP million (% to total)
Interest subsidy 2,091.58 (31)
Tax exemption 278.36 (4)
Cash/cash transfer 1,073.18 (16)
Losses 1,292.38 (17)
Administrative and other costi 2,157.55 (32)
Notes:
a Interest subsidy in 2009 is the difference between interest payments based on
market rates and interest payments based on below market rates. For low-income
packages, interest rates vary depending on amount.
b SSS/GSIS assumes that 20 percent of loans granted are socialized loan packages.
c Use BSP guidelines of 20 percent as write off for loan loss provision. Applied 3
percent for loan loss provision on nonperforming loans.
d NHA resettlement subsidy based on 2009 resettlement projects (North and
South rail). Each affected family is entitled to PHP 160,000. Resettlement subsidy
includes grant component (PHP 25,000/unit) and interest subsidy on loan portion
(PHP 135,000/unit). Includes cash assistance to households under the “balik-
probinsya” scheme.
e Other resettlement costs (administrative and other program support).
f HGC tax exemption on interest income net of guarantee payments. Based on
2009 new enrollments for guaranty.
g Losses from impaired assets and loss in sale of disposed assets.
h Budgetary appropriation for administration of pre- and post-proclamation
activities.
i Includes subdivision cost of land which is part of government subsidy on land cost.
______________
12 M. Murray 1983.PN 2011-14
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Fiscal costs from tax exemption through the
guarantee program are lowest among other forms
of subsidy. Government loss amounted to PHP
278 million in 2009. However, this forgone
income may not be necessary at all. Tax breaks
are most likely captured by the intermediaries
rather than the beneficiaries. It is also difficult
to determine how these subsidies result in lower
cost of housing for the beneficiaries.
Conclusions and recommendation
Overall, direct subsidy to the low-income
housing sector has been limited. The bulk of
fiscal costs are indirect subsidies from low
interest rate and losses from impaired assets. In
an effort to reduce losses from financial
transactions, government has further restricted
financing to the low-income sector through
lower exposure of funders and the higher loan
ceilings on socialized and low-income packages.
Recent data show that housing needs have
ballooned to 5.7 million for 2011–2016 or over
1 million housing annually, with the need
highest at the low end of the market. Clearly,
the current subsidy system does not address the
objectives of the National Shelter Program.
International experience shows that effective
housing subsidies have precise objectives and
are able to directly respond to the identified
problem. A major housing issue in the
Philippines is affordability. This issue can be
addressed in the real sector as well as in the
financial sector. In the real sector, policy
changes in land management and property rights
systems could be very efficient options but
effective housing finance is also critical to
addressing affordability issues. Housing is a
major investment and the cost of the cheapest
house in the formal market is typically six to
eight times the annual incomes in the country.
Housing finance impacts on affordability in two
ways—one, through the availability of long-
term mortgage financing that would allow
payments to be spread over time; and two,
through the provision of subsidies to lower
housing cost, specifically as an interim measure.
The issue of access and availability of long-term
finance should be addressed through capital
market development, improvement in
underwriting and securitization, and
improvement in ancillary financial services (e.g.,
credit information bureaus, insurance, property
appraisals, etc.) instead of mandating
institutions to lend to socialized housing. On
the other hand, lowering the cost of housing
should be done outside of the financial
intermediation process. Government should
avoid large potential future fiscal liabilities such
as unfunded pension liabilities or bailouts of
failed housing finance institutions. The current
housing subsidy arrangements such as the use of
contractual savings for below-market interest
rates, guaranteed take-outs of developers, and
tax exemptions may stimulate private sector
investment in low-cost housing but would not
address the issues of access and affordability for
the low-income sector.
The current housing subsidy arrangements such as the
use of contractual savings for below-market interest rates,
guaranteed take-outs of developers, and tax exemptions
may stimulate private sector investment in low-cost
housing but would not address the issues of access and
affordability for the low-income sector.PN 2011-14
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And finally, if the objective is to improve
affordability levels, direct or upfront subsidies
would have greater impact. Latin American
countries moved away from similar low-cost
contractual savings lending schemes to a
demand subsidy mechanism.13 Among the key
lessons that are worth considering for the
Philippines are:
z The housing finance subsidy should be a
transparent amount that may be budgeted and
with government commitment in terms of
amount and continuity of resources. Chile,
Colombia, and Costa Rica dedicated more than 1
percent of government budget in maintaining
temporal continuity in the long term.
z Subsidy interventions in the financial system
should be focused on low- to middle-income
households or those who are able to fulfill
obligations resulting from small loans.14 Subsidy
can be provided through a point system that
rewards the need for housing and savings effort.
z The demand subsidies should be portable,
allowing families to select their housing in
terms of type of property, location, and other
characteristics. The subsidy is given to the
household, not to the developer or financial
entity.
z The poor with incomes below minimum
wage and those with incomes that are 1.5 to 3.5
times the minimum wage require other types of
intervention. Most likely, these are through
different types of public housing arrangements
such as NHA housing and rental arrangements,
among others. 
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Subsidy interventions in the financial system should be
focused on low- to middle-income households or those who
are able to fulfill obligations resulting from small loans.
Subsidy can be provided through a point system that
rewards the need for housing and savings effort.